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The long-running WTO negotiations remain unresolved. Agriculture is the main stumbling 
block. Members have agreed to linear tariff reductions within bands, but proposed exemptions 
for sensitive products, while providing for much needed flexibility, threaten to undermine the 
ambition.  
A detailed partial equilibrium global agricultural trade model is used to analyse the likely 
impact of exemptions from the formula tariff reductions. Applying one third of the formula 
cuts to the five per cent of lines with the highest tariffs increases the final developed country 
average  agricultural  tariff  from  16  to  24  per  cent  but  the  negative  impacts  on  trade  and 
welfare are less dramatic.    
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Sensitive  products  remain  a  contentious  element  in  the  WTO  agricultural  negotiations 
because although they provide necessary flexibility, they have the potential to undermine the 
overall  ambition.  Ironically,  the  greater  the  ambition,  the  greater  the  potential  effects  of 
exemptions for sensitive products to undermine it. On the other hand, it has repeatedly been 
shown that WTO members require some flexibility to protect politically sensitive sectors.  
 
Members have agreed on the approach to tariff cuts. There shall be linear cuts within four 
bands, with the higher tariffs attracting greater reductions. To date the specific thresholds and 
tariff reductions have not been agreed, although in recent months the likely range appears to 
have narrowed. Developed and developing country groups would have different thresholds 
and linear reductions. Members have also agreed on the need for exemptions for so-called 
sensitive products. Countries will be able to designate their own products, but not agreed is 
the number of such exemptions, nor their treatment. Sensitive products will not be totally 
exempted from tariff reductions, and countries that make use of such exemptions will be 
required to provide additional access in some alternative fashion such as increasing the import 
or tariff rate quota where these exist. A formula for increasing the quota as compensation for 
a lesser tariff reduction has not been agreed. 
 
As to be expected, opinions vary on the selection and treatment of sensitive products. The 
United  States has proposed  a  very  low  number  of  tariffs (1 per  cent),  as  it maintains  its 
exporters require a real improvement in market access if they are to forgo domestic support as 
called for by other members.  The G10 group of agricultural importers, such as Japan and 
Switzerland, which have high tariffs, are pressing for a high proportion of tariffs and lower 
reductions. The G-20 group of developing countries, which includes China, Brazil and India, 
have taken  an offensive position  on agricultural tariffs  of  developed  countries.  The  G-33 
group of developing countries with defensive interests focuses on flexibilities for developing 
countries. 
 
In  this  paper  we  review  the  current  positions  on  sensitive  products  and  examine  the 
conflicting proposals. One way out of the impasse may be to increase the import quotas.
2 In 
particular we look at how increasing the flexibility undermines the trade and welfare effects. 
                                                
2 Members have not yet been able to agree on the method or magnitude of specifying quotas as 
compensation for exemptions.   3 
We also comment on the compensatory expansion of quotas as outlined in the Chairman’s 
draft and assess its feasibility. 
 
Other models have been used to analyse sensitive products. Using the general equilibrium 
model GTAP a World Bank study (Anderson et al. 2006) shows that global welfare gains 
shrink by three quarters with the inclusion of 2 per cent and 4 per cent sensitive products in 
developed and developing countries, respectively. The substantial reduction in welfare gains 
reflects  an  ambitious  base  scenario  that  does  not  allow  for  exemptions  under  the  special 
product provision. Developing countries welfare gains are positive in that scenario but they 
lose  as  a  group  in  the  scenarios  with  exemptions.  A  study  undertaken  by  UNECA  (Ben 
Hammouda et al. 2007) also shows that exemptions have a negative impact on developing and 
African  countries'  welfare  though  the  impact  is  smaller  and  the  group's  welfare  remains 
positive. Polaski (2006) also uses a version of the GTAP model. In a scenario with linear cuts 
of  36  and  24  per  cent  for  developed  and  developing  countries,  respectively,  the  latter 
experience welfare losses and flexibilities (only for developing countries) have only a modest 
impact on the results. This result is a consequence of the initially low level of ambition for 
developing country cuts.  
 
The different model applications show a common tendency. Within the group of developing 
countries there are net winners and losers from liberalisation, depending on initial trade and 
protection patterns. Developing countries as a group may gain or lose with a tendency for 
greater  gains  in  more  ambitious  scenarios,  especially  if  reductions  in  applied  tariffs  are 
specified. Countries that do not undertake reductions in applied tariffs tend to lose in these 
modelling exercises. Furthermore, the higher the initial ambition is the higher is the impact of 
exemptions.  The  exemptions  can  turn  gains  of  developing  countries  into  losses.  Some 
developing countries such as net-food importers may be net-losers but could benefit in terms 
of lower losses from exemptions of sensitive products as the level of ambition is reduced.   
 
Ambition versus flexibility  
Flexibility was accommodated in the Uruguay Round by allowing countries to reduce some 
tariff lines by only 15 per cent so long as the average cut exceeds 36 per cent. However, the 
cuts were unweighted, so a 15 per cent cut on an initial tariff of 100 per cent could be offset, 
for example, by a 57 per cent on a 10 per cent initial tariff. As a result the improvement in 
market access was a lot less then it appeared at first. Agricultural exporters are keen to avoid 
this being repeated in the current round. On the other hand, importers are keen to retain such 
flexibility. 
   4 
The Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration acknowledges the need ‘to agree on the treatment of 
sensitive products’ (WTO 2005, paragraph 7), which would be subject to lesser tariff cuts 
than specified by the formula.
3 Proposals for the number of sensitive products range from one 
per cent (G-20 and United States) to 15 per cent (G-10) of tariff lines. The European Union 
proposed eight per cent. A simulation undertaken by Australia (WTO 2006a) shows that the 
average reduction of applied tariffs using, for example, the G-20 formula with eight per cent 
of sensitive products would be less than one per cent in Brazil and less than five per cent in 
India. More recently, the Chair’s draft modalities paper of 17 July 2007 suggested a range for 
sensitive products to be within the range of 4 to 6 per cent for developed countries and one 
third more for developing countries (WTO 2007, para. 53).  
 
In addition to selection, also contentious is the treatment of sensitive products. Members have 
agreed that sensitive products would not be totally exempt from tariff cuts, and more recently 
the consensus seems to coalesce around reductions for developed countries of between one 
and two thirds of the formula cuts. This implies for example that a tariff of 100 per cent, that 
would perhaps be cut by (say) 75 per cent as it is in the top tier, would instead be reduced by 
between 25 and 50 per cent. For developing countries, the reduction would be “no less than 
two thirds” according to the suggestion put forward by the Chairman’s draft. 
 
To  counter  this  erosion  of  ambition  some  countries  have  proposed  that  each  designated 
sensitive  product  shall  be  subject  to  an  expansion  of  the  import  quota  as  compensation. 
Indeed the Framework Agreement (WTO 2004) states that ‘some MFN-based tariff quota 
expansion will be required for all such products’. The difficulties are well recognised. Where 
imports are a small proportion of domestic consumption, any increase in imports based on 
initial levels does little to improve market access. A variety of variables were put forward as a 
basis for expansion. These include: (i) domestic consumption, expressed in terms of physical 
units, (ii) current bound tariff quota volumes; and (iii) base year imports. These would give 
different  results  depending  on  the  ratio  of  imports  to  the  quota  or  to  consumption. 
Nonetheless, the Chair’s draft paper of 17 July refers to ‘new access opportunities equivalent 
to no less than [4][6] percent of domestic consumption’ (para. 57). The quota expansion is to 
be reduced if the quota is more than 10 or 20 per cent of consumption.  Finally, the additional 
quota shall be allocated on an MFN basis.  
 
                                                
3 The key documents in the negotiations are the Doha Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1), 
the Framework Agreement of 1 August 2004 (WT/L/579), sometimes called the July Framework, the 
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN(05)DEC), and the Revised Draft Modalities for 
Agriculture from July/August 2007 (TN/AG/W/4 and Corr.1). 
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The selection and treatment of sensitive products can make a significant difference to the 
level of ambition. The first task is to assess how different degrees of flexibility will affect 
liberalisation. We examine exemptions applying to the highest 1, 3, 5, 7 and 10 per cent 
tariffs in each country and report the changes in tariffs, trade and welfare effects. The results 
will  depend  somewhat  on  the  formula  reductions.  As  a  benchmark  we  take  a  standard 
scenario as proposed in the draft modalities text (WTO 2007) with medium values where 
ranges were proposed., which is somewhere between the conservative EU proposal and the 
more ambitious US offer.  We also look at quota expansion and assess whether this may 
compensate for the exemptions. The standard scenario, without exemptions, is described in 
table 1. There are five more with varying levels of exemptions.  
 
Table 1 Standard liberalisation scenario 
Scenario  Countries  Tariffs   Export 
subsidies 
Domestic support 
     %   %   % 
         
  Developed 
countries 
If >75, -70 
If >50 and ≤75, -63 
If >20 and ≤50, -57 
If ≤ 20, -50. 
 
-100  EU –80,  
US and Japan -70 
others -55 
  Developing 
countries  
If >130, -47 
If >80 and ≤130, -42 
If >30 and ≤80, -38 
If ≤ 30, -33. 
 
-100  -55 
  LDCs  0  0  0 
         
 
 
The exemptions are selected by tariff levels at the 6-digit level, with the assumption being 
that  the  most  sensitive  industries  attract  the  highest  tariffs.
4  In  developing  countries  the 
percentage difference between applied and bound rates was takes as the criteria with products 
having  the  lowest  difference  being  selected  as  sensitive  products.  This  reflects  the  likely 
approach that developing  countries apply the flexibilities in such  a  way to make as little 
changes in their applied rates as possible. The sensitive products in developing countries were 
not  selected  among  maize,  rice  and  wheat  because  these  products  were  in  all  scenarios 
                                                
4 An alternative approach is to select products according to tariff revenue, which combines the tariff 
and the trade flows. However, a possible anomaly with this approach is that sensitive products with 
prohibitive tariffs, such as Japanese rice, have low tariff revenue and are not selected. The approach 
that is adopted by Anderson et al (2006) is to take the tariff revenue forgone through implementation of 
the formula as the selection rule.   6 





To assess the impact of WTO agricultural trade policy reform we use ATPSM, a static global 
agricultural trade model jointly developed by UNCTAD and FAO. The model distinguishes 
between  bound  and  applied  tariffs  and  includes  tariff  rate  quotas  (where  the  tariff  rate 
depends on whether imports exceed a specified quota), two important features of the post 
Uruguay Round tariff structure. The model results are driven by changes in policy variables 
(tariffs, export subsidies, domestic support and tariff rate quotas) which determine changes in 
domestic prices, consumption and production. This in turn leads to a change in imports and 
exports, which feed into world prices. The model solves by finding a set of world prices that 
equate global imports and exports. Intersectoral effects are captured through cross-elasticities, 
but there are no constraints on the use of resources such as capital, labour or water. Nor is 
there account of changes in stocks. Imports are assumed to be homogeneous, with consumers 
and importers indifferent to the source of their products.
6 The results indicate the effects of 
the policy changes assuming a constant base, 2002-2004. There is no account of exogenous 
growth over the implementation period. The model is well-documented (Peters and Vanzetti 
2004)  and  is  downloadable  from  the  UNCTAD  website.
7  One  limitation  is  the  model 
commodity coverage, shown in Appendix 1, which does not include all the products covered 
by the Agreement on Agriculture. For example, wool is not included. However, the included 
commodities account for most of global agricultural trade.  
 
The data 
Price  and  production  data  are  an  average  of  2002  to  2004  and  are  compiled  from  FAO 
statistics. Elasticities are from FAO's World Food Model. These are based on a trawling of the 
literature  and  are  not  econometrically  estimated  specifically  for  the  model.  Some  of  the 
elasticities  were  modified  by  the  authors  to  reflect  homogeneity,  symmetry  and  other 
conditions.  Inquota  tariffs,  outquota  tariffs  and  global  quotas,  notified  to  the  WTO,  are 
obtained  from  the  AMAD  database  where  available  and  aggregated  to  the  ATPSM 
commodity  level.  For  the  quad  countries  plus  Norway  and  Switzerland  ad  valorem 
equivalents have been calculated based on the guidelines agreed to at the Mini-Ministerial in 
Paris in May 2005. Export subsidy data are notified to the WTO and modified by UNCTAD 
                                                
5 Special products can be designated by developing countries only but their selection is most likely 
subject to criteria related to food security, livelihood security and rural development.  
6 An Armington approach is used on the demand side to differentiate domestic and foreign products, 
but there is no differentiation between imports from different sources. 
7 The standard version of ATPSM is downloadable from www.unctad.org/tab.    7 
(Peters  2006).  Bilateral  trade  flow  data  relate  to  2004  and  are  from  the  United  Nations 
Comtrade  database. These  are used  to allocate  global quotas to  individual  countries.  The 
WTO/ITC/UNCTAD World Tariff Profile database is the source of information on applied 
and  bound  tariffs.  Ad  valorem  equivalent  tariffs  are,  however,  calculated  using  the  Paris 
Mini-Ministerial method for agricultural products so that the placement in the tiers is correct. 
Data can be accessed through the WITS software. 
 
The  present  version  of  the  model  covers  150  individual  countries  plus  two  regions,  the 
European Union, which includes 25 countries, and the Rest of World, which includes those 
countries,  mostly  small  island  economies,  not  covered  explicitly.  Developing  countries 
include Republic of Korea, and Taiwan, Province of China. A third group is the 50 least 
developed countries. There are 35 commodities in the ATPSM data set, including meat, diary 
products, cereals, sugar, edible oils, vegetables, fruits, beverages, tobacco and cotton (see 
Appendix 1). This includes many tropical commodities of interest to developing countries, 
although many of these have relatively little trade by comparison with some of the temperate 
products. 
 
Some markets include production quotas. These include EU raw sugar and dairy products, 
Canadian dairy and poultry and Japanese rice and dairy. In the absence of better information, 
in most cases the rent is assumed to be 20 per cent, with the exception of EU sugar (30 per 
cent).
8  These  quotas  are  quite  significant,  with  implicit  rent  (quantity  times  price  times 
assumed percentage rent) on these products alone amounting to $13 billion. The significance 
of production quota rents is that changes in domestic prices driven by tariff changes may have 
no effect on production until all the rent has been eroded.  
 
The results 
First, we present initial and final bound and applied tariffs under alternative  assumptions 
regarding exemptions for each WTO members. Later we show the trade and welfare effects of 






                                                
8 The EU dairy quota rent estimate of 20 per cent is supported by Requillart, V., INRA 
http://www.defra.gov.uk/foodrin/milk/supplychainforum/capinfluences.pdf, and the OECD’s PEM 
model.    8 
Changes in tariffs 
Table 2. Initial and final tariffs at various levels of exemptions for sensitive products 
  Initial  SP 0%  SP 1%  SP 3%  SP 5%  SP 7%  SP 10%
  %  %  %  %  %  %  % 
               
European Union  21.6  8.2  10.2  11.3  12.1  12.8  13.5 
United States   6.2  2.7  3.4  3.8  4.0  4.1  4.3 
Japan   31.3  10.6  13.2  16.6  18.4  19.6  21.1 
Canada   15.4  5.4  7.3  8.8  10.0  10.7  11.1 
Switzerland   64.7  20.9  30.7  32.9  34.6  36.2  38.5 
Norway   148.6  45.0  55.3  59.5  63.5  67.4  72.6 
               
WTO Developed  48.5  15.6  20.2  22.3  24.0  25.4  27.1 
WTO Developing  59.7  39.1  39.3  39.7  40.2  40.5  41.0 
WTO Developing 
applied  17.2  15.0  15.1  15.3  15.4  15.5  15.6 
Source: Simple averages derived from WTO/ITC/UNCTAD World Tariff Profiles 2006; but WTO CoA method 
used to calculate AVEs; data in table 2 based on entire tariff universe of agricultural products; analysis below 
based on ATPSM coverage of agricultural products (see Appendix 1).  
 
Table 2 shows initial and final tariffs at varying levels of sensitive products, including zero. 
Norway  and  Switzerland’s  sensitive  levels  are  two  percentage  points  above  the  other 
developed countries because they have more than 30 per cent of their initial tariffs in the top 
tier.
9 Developing countries have one third more sensitive tariffs than developed countries (and 
than indicated in the table). Tariffs are bound, except for the last row which shows applied 
tariffs for developing countries. For developed countries bound and MFN applied tariffs are 
practically  the  same.  The  first row  shows  that  the  European  Union  has  an  initial  simple 
average tariff of 22 per cent, and this would be reduced to 8 under the tariff cutting formula 
used here if there were no exemptions for sensitive products. However, as the exemptions are 
increased as indicated, the average tariff rises to 14 per cent. For most countries shown here 
the formula cuts reduce average tariffs to around 30 to 40 per cent of the base, while the ten 
per cent exemptions raise the average to between a half and three quarters. This is reflected in 
the average for developed countries as a group, where the initial average of 48 is reduced to 
16 per cent under the formula cuts and 27 per cent with 10 per cent of tariff lines exempted. 
The significant impact of a relatively small number of exemptions on the average tariff in 
developed  countries  results  from  the  typical  developed  country  tariff  schedule  with  most 
tariffs bound at low levels and some very high tariffs (figure 1).   
 
 
                                                
9 This follows a suggestion in the Draft Modalities text (WTO 2007) paragraph 54.   9 
 
 





Source: UNCTAD calculation of ad valorem equivalent tariffs based on 
WTO  CoA  method  (Paris  Mini-Ministerial);  five  products  with  tariffs 
above 500% not shown. 
 
Overall, the average tariff in each country seems to show a relatively linear relationship with 
the  rate of exemptions,  although the  sharpest  increase is  between  zero  and  one per  cent. 
However, there is no indication that there is a particular threshold above or below which 
flexibility is disproportionately gained or ambition lost.  
 
For developing countries, the exemptions for sensitive products have very little impact on 
average tariffs for the group as a whole. This is because developing countries have access to 
special products exemptions. The formula cuts reduce bound tariffs on average by a third, 
from 60 to 39 per cent, but the exemptions hardly change the average. For applied rates, the 
formula cuts tariffs from 17 to 15 per cent, with exemptions having little impact. 
 
So far the results have been discussed in terms of simple average tariffs. This doesn’t take 
account of the effect of trade flows, nor of the changes in trade flows in response to tariff 
reductions and exemptions. Imports are highly concentrated on a low number of tariff lines. 
Globally, 5 per cent of tariff lines account for 63 per cent of agricultural trade.
10 This figure is 
53 per cent for developed countries and 67 per cement for developing countries. Thus, a few 
well chosen exemptions can potentially have a significant impact on trade flows.  
 
                                                
































1 159 317 475 633 791 949 1107 1265 1423 1581 1739 1897 2055  10 
However, the tariff lines with the large trade flows are not necessarily those with the highest 
tariffs. Indeed, prohibitive tariffs have no trade flows. In the European Union, for example, 
the trade weighted average at 15.7 per cent almost one quarter below the simple average (21.6 
per cent). This results because the higher tariffs are given a relatively lower weight. 
 
Trade impacts 
The  simulated  modelling  of  trade  flows  in response  to  tariff reductions  suggests  there  is 
relatively little reduction and global agricultural trade and welfare as exemptions for sensitive 
products increase, because the products with high trade flows are not those with the highest 
tariffs. The driving force is the increase in EU and Japanese imports, which amount to $14.8 
billion and $4.3 billion under the zero exemptions and declines to $13.9 billion and $4.0 
billion under 5 per cent exemptions, and to $12.7 billion and $3.5 billion under 10 per cent 
exemptions. The major increase in imports is wheat into the European Union, which amounts 
to $4.1 billion in the standard scenario without exemptions. The initial tariff on EU wheat is 
56 per cent but this doesn’t rank in the top five per cent of tariffs. Exemptions to formula 
tariff cuts for butter, milk powder and cheese have relatively little effect on the value of 
agricultural imports because initial imports are relatively small. In absolute values, EU beef 
and sugar imports comprise the most significant changes. For Japan milk powder, butter, rice 
and sugar are the exemptions that contribute most to the change in imports.    
 
Table 3 Change in imports as exemptions increase 
Region  Initial  Change in imports 
    SP 0%  SP 1%  SP 3%  SP 5%  SP 7%  SP 10% 
  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m 
               
European Union  31679  14805  14446  14312  13888  13418  12754 
United States   22434  367  377  328  358  353  342 
Japan   14748  4237  4233  4084  4006  4004  3532 
Canada   6100  156  158  156  160  163  142 
Switzerland   1272  584  412  396  384  370  358 
Norway   747  362  320  309  309  309  293 
               
Developed  89704  22073  21438  20990  20479  19961  18684 
Developing  102350  383  316  414  270  203  116 
World  200942  21949  21260  20922  20275  19695  18337 
Source: ATPSM simulations 
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A  similar  picture  holds  for  exports,  which  are  shown  in  table  4  for  selected  countries. 
Additional world exports fall from $23 billion, 12 per cent of the base, to $18.4 billion as 
exemptions  are  increased  to  ten  per  cent.  The  figure  of  most  interest  is  the  decline  in 
additional developing country exports, from $20.0 billion to $16.3 billion with ten per cent 
exemptions. The countries that are most advantaged by the improved market access are India 
and  China,  whose  agricultural  exports  increase  significantly  off  a  relatively  low  base. 
Additional exports fall away in a relatively linear fashion as exemptions increase with roughly 
2 per cent lower export increase for any additional 1 per cent sensitive product. . 
 
Table 4 Change in exports as exemptions increase 
Region  Initial  Change in exports 
    SP 0%  SP 1%  SP 3%  SP 5%  SP 7%  SP 10%
  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m 
               
Brazil  21776  3367  3210  3109  3002  2866  2789 
China  8348  3008  2858  2847  2742  2685  2426 
India  4152  3086  2893  2748  2630  2545  2463 
Argentina  7896  1306  1285  1259  1235  1198  1129 
Australia  10636  1116  1080  1044  1019  969  860 
United States  33989  662  583  547  507  564  406 
               
WTO Developed  79841  1883  1769  1705  1525  1352  777 
WTO Developing  116745  20032  19134  18609  17960  17314  16337 
World  200942  23436  22382  21760  20866  19993  18379 
Source: ATPSM simulations 
 
Welfare 
Changes  in  exports  do  not  reflect  the  costs  of  producing  for  exports.  A  more  complete 
measure is welfare which is measured here as the change in producer and consumer surplus 
plus change in  government  revenue from  tariffs and  expenditure on export  subsidies and 
domestic support. This is shown in table 5. The first observation is that welfare gains diminish 
as  exemptions  increase  for  most  countries  in  table  5.  This  is  also  true  for  global  gains. 
However, this is not the case for many developing countries, as many are net agricultural 
importers who lose from increasing prices of imports or benefit from preferences. For this 
reason  many  developing  countries  prefer  a  less  ambitious  approach,  as  reflected  in  their 
negotiating positions. ACP countries for example proposed the least ambitious tariff reduction 
formula, including for developed country cuts, among all member states.    12 
 
Looking at specific countries, the exemptions have a big impact on the welfare gains for 
Japan, Canada and Switzerland, but less so for the European Union, the United States and 
Norway. This reflects the particular combinations of tariff cuts and trade flows. For developed 
countries as a whole the reduction in welfare gains is almost a quarter, from $12.4 billion to 
$10.4 billion, as exemptions increase to ten per cent.  
 
Table 5 Change in welfare as exemptions increase 
  SP 0%  SP 1%  SP 3%  SP 5%  SP 7%  SP 10%
  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m 
             
European Union  6511  6482  6372  6234  6037  5944 
United States   1001  1097  1091  1115  1127  1089 
Japan   3068  2891  2634  2459  2440  2224 
Canada   289  237  205  177  134  111 
Switzerland   1148  752  728  710  664  654 
Norway   647  601  590  578  574  539 
             
WTO Developed  12456  11939  11479  11151  10881  10387 
WTO Developing  -1605  -1389  -1161  -899  -722  -688 
World  13484  12725  12307  12041  11795  11321 
Source: ATPSM simulations 
 
Producer impacts 
In addition to trade and welfare effects, policy makers are also concerned about particular 
groups in society. Agricultural producers are one such group, as they are large in number and 
contain many of the poorer members of society. Hence, it is useful to look at how producers 
fare  from  trade  liberalisation.  There  are  two  contrasting  effects  to  consider.  A  fall  in  a 
country’s tariff will tend to reduce domestic prices and make producers worse off. However, a 
reduction in other countries’ tariffs will lead to an increase in world prices which will flow 
through to domestic prices.  Whether the negative  domestic effect outweighs the positive 
world price effect depends mainly on the reduction in one’s own tariff. In many developing 
countries there is no change in applied tariff because of the gap between bound and applied 
rates. In such cases producers are worse off from an increase in exemptions because world 
prices do not rise as much as otherwise.  
 
In  addition  to  price  movements,  there  are  also  quantity  effects  and  changes  in  costs  of 
production. Producer surplus is a measure of the returns to producers after accounting for 
these factors, and is shown in table 6. Developing country producer surplus is reduced from   13 
$22.4 billion in the no exemption scenario to $20.5 billion with five per cent and $18.6 billion 
with  ten  per  cent.  Data  for  the  more  populous  developing  countries  are  also  shown. 
Agricultural producers in these countries would be better off in the absence of exemptions for 
sensitive products. The reverse is true for producers in the agricultural importing countries, 
including the European Union, Japan, Switzerland and Norway. In these countries it is the 
consumers  who  from  increased  exemptions  because  domestic  prices  are  substantially 
maintained. 
 
Table 6 Change in producer surplus as exemptions increase 
  SP 0%  SP 1%  SP 3%  SP 5%  SP 7%  SP 10%
  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m  $m 
             
European Union  -28471  -28006  -27420  -27168  -26798  -26354 
United States   -6045  -5865  -5729  -5712  -5604  -5597 
Japan   -10446  -8694  -7854  -6743  -6429  -6048 
Canada   -1020  -836  -684  -557  -304  -282 
Switzerland   -2749  -1536  -1470  -1421  -1314  -1297 
Norway   -1508  -1295  -1263  -1225  -1195  -1120 
             
Brazil  2897  2771  2695  2622  2534  2456 
China  4448  4297  4252  4132  4012  3461 
India  3482  3385  3068  3031  2999  2907 
Argentina  1124  1121  1099  1079  1048  990 
             
WTO Developed  -51562  -47390  -45367  -43659  -42434  -41509 
WTO Developing  22407  21702  20974  20532  19987  18560 
World  -26696  -23309  -22072  -20893  -20291  -20899 
Source: ATPSM simulations 
 
 
New access opportunities 
Given their influence on world trade, it is useful to look at some of the EU and Japanese 
imports in more detail. The commodities selected for exemption are listed in table 7. The 
initial, final and exempted tariffs for 5 per cent sensitive products are shown in the first three 
columns. The tariffs are aggregated from the six digit level.
11 The Chair’s draft refers to “new 
access opportunities” of four to six per cent of consumption where products are selected as 
sensitive, although this would not apply where the initial import share of consumption is more 
                                                
11 For the analysis in this paper selection of SPs and formula application took place at the 6-digit level. 
It has not yet been decided in the negotiations whether the designation of sensitive products can be 
made from 6-digit tariff lines as suggested by e.g. the Cairns group or at a more disaggregated level as 
suggested by the sensitive products proponents such as EU.   14 
than 10 or 20 per cent. This dispensation would apply to sheep meat, wheat and rice for the 
European Union and milk concentrates, sugar and coffee for Japan, as shown in the sixth 
column of the table. The seventh column shows the required expansion, calculated here as 5 
per cent of consumption. This compares with the final two columns which are the estimated 
increase in imports with the final and reduced tariff cut. For example, in the first row the 
required TRQ expansion for EU bovine meat is 209 kt but the estimated increase in imports 
exceeds this even with the one third tariff cut (426 kt). Where EU imports are less than 20 per 
cent of consumption, the increase in market access exceeds the required amount for bovine 
meat and sugar but not for butter and milk concentrates. For Japan, the expansion of butter 
and rice is inadequate. However, in no case does the exemption reduce the share of imports 
from above to below the five per cent threshold. The notion of a tariff rate quota of five per 
cent of consumption, which was used as a basis for TRQs in the Uruguay Round, bears little 
relationship to compensation for lower tariff cuts. 
 




















































































































































































  %  %  %  kt  kt  %  kt  kt  kt 
                 
European Union                 
Bovine meat  77  24  39  4184  194  5  209  489  426 
Sheep meat  61  20  25  2513  1358  54  126  244  211 
Milk, conc.  110  35  59  50022  3039  6  2501  1  0 
Butter  115  35  88  2069  116  6  103  61  2 
Wheat  57  21  21  13803  5241  38  690  29549  29543 
Rice  51  19  27  6132  1280  21  307  248  248 
Sugar, raw  48  16  36  588  13  2  29  3085  1501 
Sugar, refined  76  24  36  20844  12  0  1042  4258  3663 
                   
Japan                   
Milk, conc.  173  52  91  321  46  14  16  76  51 
Butter  463  139  355  87  4  5  4  0  0 
Rice  503  151  364  8044  654  8  402  43  43 
Sugar, raw  146  44  112  2479  1514  61  124  806  242 
Coffee, proc.  106  33  80  34  25  73  2  16  6 
Source: ATPSM simulations 
 
The  problem  for  some  commodities,  including  EU  dairy  products,  is  the  existence  of 
production  quotas.  These  imply  that  a  given  change  in  domestic  price  driven  by  tariff   15 
reduction will have no impact on production and imports. Up to a point, in the absence of 
other policy changes, a change in tariffs will only change the production quotas rents, with 
only a limited change in imports.  
 
Implications and conclusions 
The change in agricultural exports in developing countries is driven by the change in imports 
in  developed  countries,  principally  the  European  Union  and  Japan.  The  exemption  from 
formula cuts of the five per cent of tariff lines with the highest tariffs increases the average 
developed country tariff from 16 per cent to 24 per cent and reduces the estimated growth in 
developed country agricultural imports from an estimated $22 billion to $19 billion. There is 
little absolute impact on developing country imports, as the increase in imports under the 
most ambitious scenario is minimal, reflecting the gap between bound and applied tariff rates 
and exemptions for special products. On the export side the growth in developing country 
exports are reduced by 10 per cent, from $20 billion to $18 billion.  Global welfare gains are 
likewise reduced from $13.5 billion to $12.0 billion but developing countries as a group are 
no worse off because many net food importers among them benefit from the reduced world 
price increases as tariff cuts are reduced. Producers in developing countries tend to lose from 
sensitive products.  
 
The  import  quota  expansion  has  the  potential  to  compensate  to  some  extent  for  tariff 
reductions but as it is envisaged in the Chairman’s draft the effects are likely to be limited if 
an import share above 10 or 20 per cent exempted importers from expanding the quota. More 
problematic is another class of products where imports are a very small share of consumption. 
In such cases the formula tariff cut would not bring imports up to the five per cent share, and 
the tariff rate quota would become non-binding. 
 
Do sensitive products undermine ambition? Most agricultural importers seem to require some 
flexibility  to  protect  political  sensitive  agricultural  industries.  Although  this  flexibility 
undermines ambition to some extent, the impacts estimated here suggest this flexibility may 
be a reasonable price to pay to get an agreement. Provisions for sensitive products make a 
significant difference to average tariffs but the trade and welfare impacts are less affected. 
This  depends,  however,  on  the  selection  of  sensitive  products  which  is  uncertain  since 
countries have not yet publicised their strategy. Anderson et al. (2006) find a higher negative 
impact of sensitive products on global gains which are probably partly due to their selection 
rule that is a combination of tariff height and imports.  
   16 
Trade reform brings about an improved use of resources, which implies more can be produced 
for less. Most of the allocative efficiency benefits are captured by the countries undertaking 
the liberalisation, although exporters also gain from improved market access. However, while 
the  efficiency  gains  are  unambiguously  positive,  the  main  effects  are  distributional,  with 
rising  prices  leading  to  a  transfer  from  consumers,  and  perhaps  taxpayers,  to  producers. 
Whether the overall effects are beneficial depends on the weight policy makers attach to the 
various  groups.  In  developed  countries  it  seems  hard  to  justify  support  to  producers  on 
economic, social or environmental grounds, but in developing countries many producers are 
poor, and support for them may be justified on social grounds. This favours higher domestic 
prices for agricultural products. On the other hand, many countries are primarily net food 
importers and have a sizeable share of poor urban consumers who are favoured by low prices. 
Such countries may prefer the status quo, especially if they receive preferential access to 
protected markets. Whether the poor are better or worse off following trade liberalisation is an 
empirical question beyond the scope of this paper, but one which policy makers in individual 
countries need to consider.      
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: ATPSM Commodities 
Livestock  Cocoa beans 
Bovine meat  Cocoa, processed 
Sheep meat  Tobacco leaves 
Pig meat  Oilseeds, temp. 
Poultry  Oilseeds, trop. 
Milk, concentrated  Vegetable oils 
Butter  Pulses 
Cheese  Tomatoes 
Hides & skins  Roots & tubers 
Wheat  Apples 
Rice  Citrus fruits 
Barley  Bananas 
Maize  Other tropical fruits 
Sorghum  Tea 
Sugar, raw  Rubber 
Sugar, refined  Cotton 
Coffee, green   
Coffee, processed   
 
Appendix 2: ATPSM Model Documentation 
The Agricultural Trade Policy Simulation Model (ATPSM) is a comparative static 
partial equilibrium global trade model with the following features: 
1.  A  simultaneous  equation  system  for  all  countries  specifying  production, 
consumption, exports and imports that respond to domestic price changes, 
given a policy changes, complete price transmission and perfectly competitive 
markets.  
2.  Tariff rate quotas and quota rents; 
3.  Distinction between bound and applied tariff rates. 
4.  Stocks remain unchanged. 
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where D, S, X, and M denote demand, supply, exports and imports respectively; 
^ denotes relative changes and ∆ absolute changes;   19 
Pw denotes world price; 
tc denotes the domestic consumption tariff and tp denotes the domestic  
    production tariff; 
ε denotes supply elasticity, η denotes demand elasticity, and γ denotes the 
initial ratio of exports to production;  
i and j are commodities indexes; and  
r is a country index. 
 
Equation  3 requires that  the change in  exports  in each  market is  some  proportion of the 
change in production. This proportion is determined by the ratio of exports to production. For 
example, if all the initial production is exported, all the change in production is exported. If 
half the initial production is exported, half of the change in production is exported. This 
implies  that  the  proportion  of  exports  to  production  is  maintained.  Equation  4  clears  the 
market, so that production plus imports equals domestic consumption and exports.
12  
 
For  this  application  the  standard  version  of  ATPSM  has  been  modified  to  include  the 
following features:  
(i)  A land constraint that redistributes unused acreage. The production of wheat, barley, 
rice, maize and sorghum in each country is raised or lowered by the average change in 
production multiplied by the ratio of land to other primary factors. This assumes a 
tonne of each crop in a country uses the some amount of land. Total production of crop 
may  fall  or  rise  depending  on  the  contribution  of  land  compared  with  capital  and 
labour. 
(ii)  Production quotas and quota rents. Production quotas are specified for EU raw sugar 
and dairy products, US tobacco, Canadian dairy  and poultry and Japanese rice and 
dairy. These quotas are assumed to be binding unless the market price falls below the 
shadow  price.  Producers  then  respond  according  to  the  specified  supply  elasticity. 
Quota rent contributes to producer surplus.  
(iii)  A producer response to changes in quota rents on exports. Here there is no shadow 
price specified. Producers respond immediately to any change in rent. This implies the 
supply curve goes through the point at which quantity and price are observed. This 
permits trade diversion when quota rents change as a result of mfn reductions. 
(iv)  An enlarged European Union with 25 members. 
(v)  An Armington specification for imports so that the share of imports in consumption is 
determined by relative domestic and import prices. The change in exports is determined 
by changes in consumption, production and imports. 
(vi)  Revision of domestic support data to include amber box payments for the major users. 
The  difficulty  here  is  the  extent  to  which  amber  box  payments  are  conflated  with 
border measures, implying that if tariffs are removed, the additional effect of reducing 
support is minimal. (See de Gorter, Ingco and Ignacio (2004b) for a comprehensive 
discussion.) 
 
                                                
12 This paragraph is taken from the ATPSM Handbook, available from UNCTAD’s website at 
www.unctad.org/tab. 